Battle of Midway - World War IIThis fleet engagement between U. S. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Japanese fleet commander, chose to invade a target relatively close to Pearl Harbor to draw out the American fleet, calculating that when the United States began its counterattack, the Japanese would be prepared to crush them. Instead, an American intelligence breakthrough–the solving of the Japanese fleet codes–enabled Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to understand the exact Japanese plans. Nimitz placed available U. S. American radio nets in the Pacific picked up various orders Yamamoto had dispatched to prepare his forces for the operation. As early as May 2, messages that were intercepted began to indicate some forthcoming operation, and a key fact, the planned day- of- battle position of the Japanese carriers, would be divulged in a notice sent on May 1. By the time Nimitz had to make final decisions, the Japanese plans and order of battle had been reconstructed in considerable detail. American combat forces took over where intelligence efforts left off. Scouts found the Japanese early in the morning of June 4. Although initial strikes by Midway- based planes were not successful, American carrier- based planes turned the tide. The Battle of Midway in early June 1942, marked the turning point of World War II in the Pacific as American aircraft sank four Japanese carriers. Torpedo bombers became separated from the American dive- bombers and were slaughtered (3. Japanese defenses just in time for the dive- bombers to arrive; some of them had become lost, and now by luck they found the Japanese. The Japanese carriers were caught while refueling and rearming their planes, making them especially vulnerable. The Americans sank four fleet carriers–the entire strength of the task force–Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, with 3. The Japanese also lost the heavy cruiser Mikuma. American losses included 1. Analysts often point to Japanese aircraft losses at Midway as eliminating the power of the Imperial Navy’s air arm, but in fact about two- thirds of air crews survived. More devastating was the loss of trained mechanics and aircraft ground crews who went down with the ships. Some historians see Midway as the turning point in the Pacific theater of the war, after which Americans rode straight to Tokyo; others view it as a cusp in the war, after which initiative hung in the balance, to swing toward the Allies in the Guadalcanal campaign. The Battle of Midway was a naval battle between the U.S. This was about 6 months after Japan bombed Pearl.Either way, Midway ranks as a truly decisive battle. JOHN PRADOSThe Reader’s Companion to Military History. Edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. The Tomatometer rating – based on the published opinions of hundreds of film and television critics – is a trusted measurement of movie and TV. The Doolittle Raid on Japan in April 1942 demolished the Japanese military's perception that their homeland was immune from air attack. They realized that in order to. Battle of Midway, (June 3–6, 1942), World War II naval battle, fought almost entirely with aircraft, in which the United States destroyed Japan ’s first-line. The Battle of Midway chronicles a significant moment in U.S. History, as have other Ford films like Young Mr. Lincoln (1939) and My Darling Clementine. The Battle of Midway was a Pacific-theater battle of World War II, fought in 1942 and widely regarded as one of the most important naval battles of the Pacific. On this day in History, Battle of Midway begins on Jun 04, 1942. Learn more about what happened today on History. The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War. Before the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7- the Imperial Navy of Japan had swept asid. Battle of Midway - Wikipedia. The Battle of Midway was a decisive naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Spruance decisively defeated an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chuichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondo near Midway Atoll, inflicting devastating damage on the Japanese fleet that proved irreparable. Military historian John Keegan called it . The Japanese hoped another demoralizing defeat would force the U. S. Luring the American aircraft carriers into a trap and occupying Midway was part of an overall . This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself. The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Most significantly, American cryptographers were able to determine the date and location of the planned attack, enabling the forewarned U. S. Navy to prepare its own ambush. All four of Japan's large aircraft carriers. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's capacity to replace its losses in materiel (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well- trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal Campaign, is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific War. Background. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1. There were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Imperial Navy (IJN), and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral. Isoroku Yamamoto's. Combined Fleet, and a follow- up strategy was not formed until April 1. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 1. April 1. 94. 2, in which 1. U. S. Army Air Forces. B- 2. 5 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the accessibility of Japanese territory to American bombers. Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land- based air power on the Hawaiian Islands since the December 7 attack the previous year, he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. This meant that Midway was outside the effective range of almost all of the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian islands. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island. Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west. Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex. His design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 1. U. S. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown damaged so severely that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. Much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale, which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral Ch. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever elements of the U. S. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support each other. For instance, despite the fact Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway. The IJA wished to occupy the western Aleutians to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U. S. The Japanese operations in the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts considered the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, early twenty- first century research has suggested that AL was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. A one- day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every available U. S. He already had Vice Admiral. William Halsey's two- carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) task force at hand, though Halsey was stricken with severe dermatitis and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral. Raymond A. Spruance, Halsey's escort commander. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship USS Vestal, herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard. The dive and torpedo squadrons were replaced with those from USS Saratoga, with Yorktown's own dive bomber squadron remaining in the scout bomber role. The fighter squadron was reformed with replacement F4. F- 4 Wildcat aircraft and aircrew drawn from Saratoga. In addition, surviving pilots from USS Lexington, under the command of Lexington's Lieutenant Commander John S. Some of the aircrew were inexperienced, which may have contributed to an accident in which Thach's executive officer was killed. The USAAF contributed a squadron of 1. B- 1. 7 Flying Fortresses and 8 B- 2. Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in total 1. Although the F2. As and SB2. Us were already obsolete, they were the only aircraft available to the Marine Corps at the time. Although the carrier Zuikaku escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group, and was in port in Kure awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available is attributable to the failure of the IJN crew training program, which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses. Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall. They also note that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their pilots must train as a single unit (in contrast, American training was conducted only at the squadron level). In any case, the Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for the forthcoming battle. This was at partly due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1. Darwin and Colombo. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable A6. M . For a variety of reasons, production of the . These factors meant all carriers of the Kido Butai had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts stored in the carriers' hangars. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as . Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea in Yamato, assumed Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo, and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to reveal his position. For reasons which remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions. It was initially not known where . Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, all too widely separated to be able to support each other. Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U. S. The Japanese, by contrast, remained mainly unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began. Navy patrol squadron VP- 4. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force. Three hours later, they found Tanaka's transport group 5. Although their crews reported hitting 4 ships. This was the only successful air- launched torpedo attack by the U. S. At the same time he launched his 8 search aircraft (one from the heavy cruiser. Tone launched 3. 0 minutes late). Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force. As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 1. PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 0. 5: 3. 4, a PBY reported sighting 2 Japanese carriers and another spotted the inbound airstrike 1. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At 0. 6: 2. 0, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U. S. Midway- based Marine fighters, which included 7 F4. Fs and 2. 1 F2. As. Within the first few minutes, 3 F4. Fs and 1. 3 F2. As were destroyed, while most of the surviving U.
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